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Robbins Burling 
Department of Anthropology, University of Michigan 
The progressive evolution of the biological capacity to learn and use highly complex 
language is unlikely to be explained primarily by any subsistence or technological ad- 
vantages that language offers. Rather, language probably served social purposes. In 
particular, two relationships could have driven selection in favor of increasingly com- 
plex language. First, in most or all societies, those who rise to positions of leadership 
tend to be recognized as having high linguistic skills. Second, in the kinds of society 
in which language must be presumed to have evolved, leaders tend to raise more children 
to maturity than do other people. Together, these two relationships would give a long 
term selective advantage to increasingly skillful speakers. 
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LANGUAGE IN PREURBAN SOCIETY 
I 
n the extensive, albeit speculative, literature on the evolutionary 
origins of language (e.g., Hamad, Steklis, and Lancaster 1976; Wescott 
1974; de Grolier 1983; see also the massive bibliography in Hewes 
1975), the adaptive advantages that would lead to the selection of lin- 
guistic ability seem to have been taken largely for granted. Where selection 
for language has been considered at all, the presumption has usually been 
that language would be an obvious advantage for gatherers and hunters, who 
needed to cooperate as they entered a subsistence niche not previously oc- 
cupied by hominoids. Language ability, it has been supposed, would have 
been useful both in planning and coordinating the food quest itself and in 
reaching agreement upon the location of rendezvous points and central base 
camps (e.g., Lancaster 1968, p. 454; Hewes 1974, p. 15ff; Peters 1974, p. 
89ff, * 
Such factors seem plausible as encouraging the first stages in the emer- 
gence of language but they offer little explanation for the peculiarly complex 
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type of language of which modern humans are capable. Why would a simpler 
language, perhaps something more like a rudimentary pidgin, not have been 
entirely adequate for subsistence purposes in the kinds of societies in which 
language evolved? Remarkably little attention has been given to the selective 
advantages offered by the baroque syntax or by the enormous vocabulary 
of near synonyms that are characteristic of all human languages today. To 
a modern and highly verbal linguist, the advantages of being able to talk in 
a complex and nuanced way may seem so obvious as hardly to invite dis- 
cussion. Nevertheless, the selective pressures that would have fostered the 
development and perpetuation of such complex linguistic forms should by 
no means be taken for granted. In this article I will not be concerned with 
the initial emergence of the first stages of human language, but I will suggest 
a selective mechanism that might have driven the continued evolution of an 
increasingly complex language once the process had been launched. 
The earliest remains of writing persuade us that languages of a fully 
modern degree of complexity were spoken at the time of the urban revo- 
lution, five or six thousand years ago, and archeological and fossil remains 
suggest that, in all likelihood, they were already spoken as early as the 
beginning of the upper Paleolithic, about 30,000 years ago. Only a certain 
robustness distinguishes fossil hominids of that era from modern humans, 
and it is difficult to doubt the capacity of those who left such remains for 
handling languages of the type and complexity that we know today. We must 
suppose, therefore, that the evolution of the biological capacity for learning 
and using a language of the modern type took place earlier in small and 
technologically simple societies, primarily those in which subsistence was 
based upon gathering and hunting. When we consider the forces that would 
have promoted the selection of individuals capable of using a lexically, syn- 
tactically, and phonologically complex language, therefore, we must con- 
sider the conditions of life in the small preurban and preagricultural societies 
that characterized human life for the first several million years of our time 
on earth. It was in such societies that language began, and it was also in 
such societies that increasingly complex language came to be used. 
We can agree that some degree of language would be useful in a hunting 
and gathering adaptation, but it is not clear that such an adaptation would 
benefit in any way from a language having the high degree of complexity 
shown by all modern human languages. Excellent coordination in hunting 
could be achieved with a far less intricate language than ours. As has often 
been pointed out, members of some predatory species achieve effective co- 
operation in hunting with no language at all (Schaller 1972). In the direct 
and personal kinds of attack and defense that faced our evolving ancestors, 
the noise of talking must often have been more dangerous than total silence, 
and an intricate language would have been of little use. A single word or a 
single cry would have been more useful when warning a fellow australopi- 
thecine of an attacking lion than a paragraph of polished prose. Even today, 
when precise coordination under stressful conditions is required, we usually 
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strip our language down to unambiguous essentials. To minimize misun- 
derstanding we deliberately avoid linguistic complexities. “Duck!” is more 
effective than “Please lower your head in order to avoid that flying rock.” 
Language would have been more useful for initial planning of foraging 
and hunting than for actually conducting these activities, but a few hundred 
words, rather than the thousands of subtle near synonyms found in all mod- 
em languages, together with a bit of loose syntax and the kind of pointing 
that accompanies all language, should have been quite enough to tell others 
about the location and condition of berries and roots or the probable move- 
ments of animals. A complexly nuanced language does not seem to offer 
any special advantage for such activities. We are, then, left with a puzzle. 
If highly complex language is not needed for subsistence, what alternative 
selective pressures might have encouraged its emergence? Why do we have 
languages that are capable of elaborate phrases if simple phrases would have 
served as well in the kinds of societies in which language evolved? 
Perhaps the education of the young in subsistence techniques would 
call upon more subtle linguistic skills than the practice of subsistence among 
mature adults. Words might supplement demonstration and observation of 
technological skills even if the actual use of these skills among adults would 
no longer need many words. The pedagogical use for language, like its use 
in hunting, has an initial plausibility, and it is certainly true that in our own 
society we make extensive use of language in technical education. In hunting 
bands and village communities, however, education for subsistence, like the 
practice of subsistence, could certainly be accomplished with a far less com- 
plex or subtle language than the people who live in these communities can 
actually use (Hewes 1974, p. 18; Bruner 1972, p. 701). 
My own observations of language use among slash and burn farmers in 
northeastern India could, I believe, be duplicated by the observations of 
many ethnographers who have worked with hunters and gatherers or with 
people having a simple agricultural technology.’ My Garo friends performed 
their technical tasks with a minimum of verbal coordination. People knew 
what needed to be done, knew how to do it, and knew when to do it. The 
minimum degree of coordination that was technologically required could 
easily have been achieved with a pidgin-like language of restricted vocab- 
ulary and simple sentence structure. Even the technical education of the 
young required only a modest use of language. I wanted to learn the technical 
skills of my hosts and, in my Western way, I would occasionally ask someone 
to explain how to tie a knot or how to hold a knife when cutting bamboo. 
About the only technical instruction I could ever elicit, however, would come 
when a man would reach for my tool, demonstrate the manner in which the 
job should be done, and then hand back the tool along with with the in- 
junction: “Do it like that.” This was also about all that children received 
’ I worked in the Garo Hills, then administratively a semiautonomous district of Assam, India, 
in the mid 1950s. I remain profoundly indebted to the Ford Foundation, which supported my 
field work. 
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in the way of technical education. Children did learn many other things with 
the help of language-what would happen if they were impolite to their 
mother’s brother, how to placate the spirits, which cousins are improper 
marriage partners-but subsistence and technical activities required little 
language either in use or in transmission to the next generation. 
In a poor village near Varanasi in the State of Uttar Pradesh in India, 
I was once able to observe a young deaf mute woman of about 18. She had 
grown up in a family of meager literacy and, so far as I am aware, she had 
received no formal education. Having had no contact with other deaf mutes, 
she had had no opportunity to learn a conventional sign language, though, 
of course, she communicated with other members of her family with home- 
signs of their own devising. In spite of her handicap and lack of formal 
education, this young woman performed many tasks with apparent ease and 
normality. She dressed herself as other women of her age dressed. She 
helped with the cooking. She went to the fields and helped with the culti- 
vation. So far as I could tell, she easily pulled her own weight in subsistence 
activities. Of course she was cut off from large segments of the culture, but 
the absence of a nuanced language hardly cut her off at all from its sub- 
sistence or technical aspects. 
In preurban band and village communities, where technology can be 
easily seen and understood, and where it can be learned by direct imitation, 
it does not require the subtle kind of language that all human societies pos- 
sess. The evolutionary processes that took place in societies of this sort 
seem to have endowed us with more language than these societies could 
have used. If subsistence needs were not the driving force behind the de- 
velopment of language, we must wonder what other advantages might have 
led to its selection? I will return to this question below. 
LINGUISTIC VARIABILITY 
Selection can occur only when the trait under selection is variable and when 
some, at least, of its variation is the result of genetic variability. This has 
to mean that, during the period when the ability to use increasingly complex 
language was evolving, individuals varied from one another in their inherited 
capacity for language. To attribute individual differences in language ability 
to genetic differences violates the egalitarian ideology that most linguists 
hold dear. Nevertheless, the capacity for language surely did evolve, and it 
could not have done so without a variable genetic base upon which selection 
could work. The genetically based differences in linguistic ability, moreover, 
must have contributed to differential reproductive success. 
The bias against searching for genetically based differences in linguistic 
skills is a strong one, and linguists have been reluctant to give any attention 
at all to individual differences. The sociolinguists have recently introduced 
a new interest in linguistic variability to the field, but even they have usually 
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stopped short of examining genuinely individual differences. They have been 
willing to ask how the language of one narrowly defined social group, such 
as black middle-class children in a particular grade of a particular school, 
differs from the language of their otherwise comparable white classmates, 
but they have been leery about the last step-asking how two particular 
individuals differ from one another. 
There are, to be sure, exceptions to this self-imposed restriction. The 
study of aphasia and other speech abnormalities necessarily involves the 
investigator in idiosyncratic linguistic traits, and a more general approach 
to individual language differences is found in Fillmore, Kempler, and Wang 
(1979). As the editors begin their introduction to this pioneering set of ar- 
ticles, they pose a number of questions that are notably unconventional 
among linguists: 
People can differ greatly, and sometimes obviously, in the ways they use 
and control their language. Even with the same communicative goals, 
speakers will vary in many ways in their language performance, whether it 
is in the choice of words or intonation patterns, in the pacing of their ut- 
terances or in turn-taking strategies, or in the coherence or effectiveness 
of the total performance. We have wondered how such individual differ- 
ences should be understood; in particular, we have wanted to learn how 
such differences could be seen as relating to social, psychological, or bi- 
ological parameters. In what ways does personality determine, and in what 
ways is personality determined by, an individual’s language resources? How 
and why do cultures value language fluency differently? How does our own 
culture identify, assess, and cultivate language ability? Does the observed 
variation in language ability have any basis in biological equipment? (p. 1). 
I find these to be important though radical questions for linguists to be 
posing. The remarkably varied background of the research presented in the 
papers assembled by Fillmore, Kempler, and Wang and the tentative nature 
with which many authors present their results also confirm my belief that 
this is unfamiliar terrain. The contributors have addressed what I take to be 
important issues, but in this first attempt they could hardly have been entirely 
clear, to say nothing of united, on the best means of doing so. 
The more orthodox linguistic attitude about variability is represented 
by Chomsky’s (1965, p. 3) explicit injunction that “Linguistic theory is con- 
cerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homoge- 
neous speech-community . . .” but this attitude, if not its explicit formu- 
lation, reaches back far before Chomsky. Linguists have seen language as 
a shared system, and even the finest grained sociolinguistic studies have 
stopped short of attributing linguistic characteristics to the individual. For 
the most part, linguists have systematically, even deliberately, ignored the 
possibility that individuals might differ in their linguistic ability. We have 
repeatedly asserted that all normal human beings learn to speak the language 
of their community, and we have rarely stopped to wonder whether all these 
normal people speak in exactly the same way. We have examined the com- 
monalities of a language, not the individual differences. 
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There are good reasons for the skittishness that many of us have felt 
when facing the possibility of individual differences in language ability. The 
measurement of linguistic skills is a big business in the United States. Ad- 
vancement in both education and employment often rests on the results of 
tests that are intended to measure verbal aptitude. Linguists have found 
much to criticize in these tests, for they reduce what must be a multitude 
of separate skills to simplistic global measures, and they ignore the reality 
of dialect variation (Wolfram 1976). They are surely biased in favor of the 
fortunate children of the middle class. The serious difficulties posed by any 
attempt to sort out truly individual differences from differences that reflect 
class, ethnic membership, bilingual background, age, sex, or an apparently 
limitless range of other sociological variables have made many linguists skep- 
tical of the whole enterprise. The manifestly dangerous biases of so many 
verbal aptitude tests have even encouraged some of us to throw our hands 
up in horror at the very suggestion that aptitude differences can be measured 
or that they even exist. Even if they do exist and even if they can be mea- 
sured, it may seem prejudicial to recognize or to talk about them. 
The refusal to acknowledge individual differences, however, runs up 
against some other stubborn intuitions and observations. All those who are 
not linguists seem to have utter confidence that the people they know differ 
substantially in their linguistic skills. When not wearing their professional 
hats, even linguists describe their acquaintances as “articulate,” “fluent,” 
“taciturn,” “glib,” “slow spoken,” “a polished speaker,” or “a master of 
malapropisms.” Not only in our society, but very likely in other societies 
as well, people recognize some among their fellows as having outstanding 
linguistic skills of one sort or another-as arguers, orators, raconteurs, 
bards, punsters, rhyme makers, or, in literate societies, as writers. It is, I 
suspect, a universal characteristic of human societies that individual differ- 
ences in linguistic ability are recognized, and it also appears to be universal, 
or very nearly so, that high linguistic ability is admired. The particular lin- 
guistic skills that are most admired probably vary considerably from one 
society to another, however, and it is surely the case that there are several 
different kinds of linguistic skills. The simplifications implicit in verbal ap- 
titude tests that reduce all variability to a single scale seem totally unwar- 
ranted, but the conclusion that there are no individual differences at all seems 
equally misguided. 
Individual differences, of course, can be of two types. On the one hand 
there are differences that seem to be rankable along some scale, as more or 
less advanced, as demonstrating greater or lesser linguistic ability, as allow- 
ing more or less complexity, as better or worse for some purpose. On the 
other hand there are nonrankable differences, such as inconsequential var- 
iability in pronunciation or even voice quality, special development of some 
arJeas of vocabulary, or idiosyncratic differences in syntactic detail. Of the 
two, linguists have found nonranked differences safer to investigate. We 
may be able to agree that people exhibit all sorts of idiosyncrasies in their 
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speech while denying that these reflect any underlying differences in ability 
or contribute in any way to differential success at any activity. In spite of 
the phrase “language ability” that is included in the title of the collection 
of articles edited by Fillmore, Kempler, and Wang, and repeated several 
times in their introduction, a good proportion of their contributors take re- 
fuge in the safer topic of nonranked differences that seem independent of 
anything we would call “ability.” They thereby avoid the issue of ability 
altogether. 
If, however, we suppose our language to be in any way “better,” “more 
developed,” “more complex,” or “capable of more subtlety” than the lan- 
guage of our ancestors of, let us say, two million years ago, we have to be 
concerned with rankable differences. It is only if individuals have differed 
in rankable linguistic abilities that evolution in the direction of higher ranked 
abilities could have taken place. Surely there was an evolutionary trend 
through time in such matters as the size of vocabulary that individuals could 
control and in the complexity of grammatical detail that they could handle. 
This evolution must have been built upon differences that were ordered along 
these dimensions within once living populations. In what follows, therefore, 
I will not be concerned with nonrankable idiosyncratic differences and will 
of necessity focus upon the more sensitive issue of rankable differences in 
linguistic ability. Most specifically I will be concerned with those aspects 
of rankable linguistic abilities that reflect, at least in part, genetic variability. 
I do not see how we can talk about the evolution of language unless we are 
willing to admit that individuals have differed in their inherited linguistic 
abilities. 
If we are willing to grant that individuals vary in some dimensions of 
their language ability, and if we will grant that some of this variability must, 
in part, reflect genetic differences, we need only extrapolate backward to 
our ancestors of thousands and millions of years ago to feel that there must 
have been ample variability upon which selection could operate. Indeed, 
those who have worked with chimpanzees in recent decades have noted 
clear individual differences in their ability to acquire signs (Fouts and Couch 
1976; Premak 1983). What remains is to propose a mechanism that would 
have selected in favor of those individuals who were capable of handling 
more complex language than most of their contemporaries. 
SELECTIVE ADVANTAGES 
Having tried to cast doubt upon subsistence and technical education as the 
primary areas that would favor the selection of high language abilities, I will 
offer an alternative and suggest that the selective advantages of language 
are to be found in the social rather than the technological sphere of human 
life. Specifically, I suggest that in pre-urban societies, and perhaps even in 
our own, language in its delicately nuanced forms is used, not so much for 
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basic subsistence tasks, as for establishing, maintaining, and refining social 
relationships. In much the same way as Jolly (1966) and Humphrey (1976) 
argue that our intelligence evolved as a means of dealing with other indi- 
viduals and is, therefore, primarily a social intelligence, I suggest that it is 
when dealing with people, not material objects, that we call upon our richest 
linguistic resources. 
It is in defining ourselves in relation to others, in conducting interper- 
sonal negotiations, in competing, in manipulating, in scheming to get our 
own way, that the most subtle aspects of language become imfiortant. We 
need language for arguing our case, for claiming our rights, for leaving just 
the right degree of ambiguity, for outdoing our rivals in our many intricate 
forms of verbal competition, for talking our way out of uncomfortable sit- 
uations. When disputes grow dangerous, we need language as an alternative 
to violence. We need our very best language for winning a lover. 
When we look beyond subsistence activities, and consider interpersonal 
relationships as the primary arena for complex and modulated language, new 
and different selective mechanisms offer themselves as plausible. In partic- 
ular, there are two relationships that may have been found quite generally 
in preurban societies and that, taken together, would give a selective ad- 
vantage to high language ability. First, leaders are often acknowledged within 
their community to possess special and admirable linguistic abilities. Second, 
there is a widespread tendency for high-ranking men to father a larger than 
average number of children or to raise a larger proportion of their children 
to maturity. If better speakers become leaders and if leaders raise more 
children, we have a mechanism that would drive the selection for better 
linguistic skills. Do we have grounds for taking these relationships seriously? 
I turn to the second relationship first, since it is somewhat easier to justify. 
The relationship between rank and the number of children is supported 
by several recent demographic studies in widely varying populations, and 
it can even be looked upon as the human expression of the much more 
widespread tendency for the dominant males of many species to produce 
more than their share of offspring. The best studied example is that of the 
Yanomamos, and Chagnon, Flinn, and Melancon (1979, pp. 317-319) give 
careful figures to show that Yanomamo headmen, due both to polygyny and 
to more prompt remarriage after the loss of an earlier wife, have more wives 
than the average male. Their figures also suggest that the average headman’s 
wife has more children than do wives of other men, although this difference 
does not reach the level of statistical reliability. Chagnon, summarizing, says 
“Headmen, in particular, continue to acquire wives in their later life and 
tend to produce significantly larger numbers of offspring than other males” 
(Chagnon and Irons, 1979, p. 384). 
Neel(l980, p. 283) argues that Yanomamo who become headmen tend, 
in a number of respects including language, to be more capable than the 
average male. He states that headmen father approximately twice as many 
children as other men, and he suggests that this differential reproduction is 
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“the principal agent . . . of the selection necessary to offset the dispersive 
factors just mentioned.” The “dispersive factors” to which he refers result 
from the steady accumulation of deleterious mutations, which, he believes, 
help to prevent some men from becoming headmen. 
In a very different society, William Irons (1979) shows that the wealthier 
men among pastoral Turkmen of Iran raise substantially more children than 
do the poorer men. His article does not specifically consider the relation of 
wealth and leadership, but it is likely that they go together. 
There are several reasons for the reproductive success of high-ranking 
men. *The most obvious is the widespread tendency for polygyny to be the 
special prerogative of men with high status. Men are capable, biologically, 
of siring very large numbers of offspring, and they are limited primarily by 
their restricted access to women. Those men who manage to command the 
reproductive powers of more than a single woman can easily produce extra 
children. In fact, it is a very general tendency in human populations, as 
indeed in animal populations (see, e.g., Clutton-Brock, Guiness, and Albon 
1982), that males vary far more widely than females in the number of off- 
spring they produce. A few human males father large numbers of children, 
while others are excluded from reproduction. 
In addition, however, chiefs or others of high status command more 
human and material resources than do others, and they are often able to use 
these resources to benefit their own children. In this way, they may be better 
able to ensure the survival of their children to reproductive age. Daly and 
Wilson (1983, p. 333), citing Driver (1963), describe an area in central India 
where “the fertility of (monogamous) couples showed no relationship to the 
husband’s income, but the number of surviving children increased with in- 
creasing affluence.” Thus even in the absence of polygyny, we can expect 
that high status will tend to be reflected in a larger number of surviving 
children. 
In view of the help that siblings give to one another, Neel(l980, p. 284) 
proposes that differential reproductive success should show up even more 
strongly in the grandchildren’s generation than in that of the children. On 
the basis of computer simulation, he suggests that in a society like that of 
the Yanomamos, more than half the males can be expected to have no grand- 
children at all. A few others, of course, would have very large numbers. 
I have emphasized the reproductive success of men because of the 
greater variability in the numbers of children they produce. Since there is 
a strict ceiling on the number of children that a woman can bear, their re- 
production is considerably less variable than that of men, at least in the first 
generation. This means that any discussion of reproductive potential tends 
to sound sexually biased to those sensitive to suggestions of male-female 
differences. In spite of the smaller variation in the numbers of children born 
to women, however, women with superior social skills should be able to 
help to accumulate more resources, and they might also be able to win more 
successful fathers for their children. In these ways, a woman’s social skills 
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should join with those of a man to affect the number of children who survive. 
Moreover, through their genetic contribution to their sons, women also con- 
tribute to the variable reproductive success of the next generation. All of 
this means that the variable genetic contribution of women also contributes 
to reproductive success, although that may become unambiguous only with 
the second generation (Hrdy and Williams 1983). 
At any event, the reproductive variability of men is more quickly ap- 
parent than that of women, and it is thus easier to measure. Furthermore, 
since most formal positions of leadership have tended to be monopolized 
by men, it is also with men that we can most readily test the possibility that 
language, leadership, and reproduction are all related. 
The relation between language ability and leadership is less easy to pin 
down than is the relation between status and numbers of offspring, but the 
impressions of a good many ethnographers make it seem plausible. Perhaps 
the most convincing array of evidence for the high language skills of leaders 
is found in Bloch (1975). The case studies in this collection suggest that in 
a remarkably wide range of societies, leaders are good talkers. Andrew 
Strathem (1975), for instance, in describing the people of Mount Hagen in 
the Western Highlands of Papua New Guinea, says: 
A man can . . retain prominence . . . for long periods of time well into 
his old age and one of the resources he has at hand for doing so is his ability 
to speak (p. 186). 
Prominent men are speech-makers. A man can raise numerous pigs and give 
many away in moka [ceremonial exchange] but he cannot effectively influ- 
ence his fellow-men unless he can use speech persuasively . . most big- 
men are in fact good speakers, although some are much more persuasive 
and fluent than others (p. 187). 
David Turton (1973) describes the very different society of the Mursi 
of pastoral East Africa, but his conclusions are similar: 
One does not have to attend many meetings in a particular locality before 
coming to recognize the more influential men of the area. They are the 
speakers who are listened to without interruption and whose speeches tend 
to come toward the end of a debate, not because there is any set order of 
speakers, but because the very nature of their contributions reduces the 
need for further discussion (p. 173). 
Since it is thus through consensus alone that public meetings reach agree- 
ment, it is not surprising that the most frequently mentioned attribute of 
an influential man is his ability to speak well in public (p. 176). 
It is not only the tone of a speech, but also the skill with which it is con- 
structed that seems to impress an audience. Mursi public speeches tend to 
be very allusive, simply because this is a small and fairly isolated language 
community, but some men appear to excel in the subtlety with which they 
employ allusions and images in their speeches, thereby achieving a terseness 
of style which is much appreciated by the audience (177). 
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Admiration for high linguistic ability and the elevation of good talkers 
to positions of leadership is by no means limited to the kinds of societies 
with which anthropologists have been most familiar. In his study of early 
classic Greece, Havelock (1963) describes the relation of language and lead- 
ership in this way: 
within limits, the community’s leadership lay with those who had a superior 
ear and rhythmic aptitude, which would be demonstrable in epic hexameter. 
It would also however show itself in the ability to compose rhemata- 
effective sayings which used other devices besides the metrical, such as 
assonance and parallelism. Again, the good performer at a banquet would 
be estimated not exclusively as an entertainer but as a natural leader of 
man . . . the effective judge or even general tended to be the man with the 
superior oral memory. . . . The general effect was to put a great premium 
upon the intelligence in Greek social transactions and to identify intelligence 
with power. By intelligence we specially mean a superior memory and a 
superior sense of verbal rhythm (p. 126). 
These examples come from technologically more developed societies 
than those in which language evolved, but there seems no reason to suppose 
that the relationship between language and leadership was any less signifi- 
cant in earlier societies. Although the resources of hunting and gathering 
societies did not ordinarily allow the kind of institutionalized chiefdoms 
sometimes found in more settled societies, they still included men of special 
influence and these men must have used skillful language in order to assert 
their leadership. 
Although the examples that I have given refer primarily to language of 
the political arena, it is the more general human experience that people gain 
influence in all areas of life, in their families and among their friends as well 
as in the wider community, through their ability to argue their case verbally, 
to present themselves well with words. People exploit their ability in lan- 
guage as they compete with one another for social position, for sexual part- 
ners, and for power, and their recognized linguistic skills make some people 
appear to others as especially well qualified for positions of responsibility. 
It is the impression of many ethnographers that the influential men and 
women in the communities where they have worked tend to be particularly 
verbal. Even in our own society, of course, those who reach influential 
positions, not only in government but also in such spheres as business and 
education, tend to be recognized as highly verbal individuals. A technically 
skilled horticulturist, machinist, jeweler, sculptor, or dentist need not have 
strong verbal facility. A leader needs language. 
As a social activity, of course, it is not enough that language is spoken. 
It must also be understood, or at least recognized and appreciated. Language 
that demonstrates a high order of ability would be of very little use if others 
in the community did not acknowledge its special qualities. To the extent 
that there is a genetic component in the ability to use language of high com- 
plexity, we can expect that, at least to some degree, high language ability 
will run in families. In maximizing their inclusive fitness, individuals might 
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then be able to rely upon the corresponding linguistic capacities of near 
kinsmen. However, the exploitation of one’s own linguistic capacities does 
not necessarily require that others share these capacities to the same degree. 
Those who use language are always able to understand a considerably wider 
range and variety of speech than they can use. All of us can understand 
words and all of us can understand dialects that we cannot produce. We are 
able to appreciate and be persuaded by those who speak more skillfully than 
we do ourselves. ‘Nonpoets can be moved by poets. 
The possibility that apes might be able to learn to understand, as op- 
posed to produce, a certain amount of human spoken language has been 
rather lost in the enthusiasm for teaching them to sign. There is, however, 
a good deal of anecdotal evidence, and at least a bit of experimental evidence, 
that suggests that chimpanzees and gorillas can learn to understand some 
natural human language (Kellogg and Kellogg 1933; Fouts, Chown, and 
Goodwin 1976; Patterson 1978). This would suggest that when a few early 
hominids began to use the rudimentary antecedents of language they would 
have been understood by their fellows, even if the others were deficient in 
answering back. At any point in the evolution of language, we must suppose 
that some individuals could use more complex language than others. Quite 
possibly some families were able to profit by the special linguistic ability of 
a number of their members. We need not suppose, however, that problems 
of limited understanding posed any serious impediment for those who were 
at the forefront of linguistic evolution. Most others should have been able 
to understand the language and appreciate the linguistic ability of the most 
skillful, even when they could not equal that ability themselves. 
In fact, we may suspect that the selective pressures favoring better 
language comprehension were at least as strong, and quite possibly stronger, 
than the selective pressures favoring more skillful production. There are 
manifest advantages in being able to use the gestures and noises of other 
individuals in order to predict their intentions. The advantages of revealing 
one’s own intentions by producing gestures or noises are much less clear. 
Although selection must have favored good speakers, it must also have fa- 
vored those who were able to conceal their intentions. The ability to com- 
municate information seems less advantageous to the individual than the 
ability to manipulate, though one way to manipulate others, of course, is to 
provide them with selected information (Krebs and Davies 1984). 
One objection that might be raised against my argument is that it is the 
leaders themselves who define what the community accepts as “good:’ lan- 
guage. If “good” language is, by definition, whatever the leaders speak, 
then their language is no sign of special talent. This argument, of course, is 
familiar in our own society, where linguists insist that the popular disdain 
for nonstandard dialects is simply a reflection of their disdain for those who 
speak them. No narrowly linguistic justification can be found for the ad- 
miration directed toward standard language (Labov 1969). 
To admit that the upper classes are able to define “correct” (i.e., “stan- 
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dard”) language in our own society, however, does not dispose of individual 
differences in linguistic ability. To insist that all dialects are linguistic equals 
is not the same thing as the claim that all individuals are linguistic equals. 
Among those who adhere closely to the norms of standard English, some 
can use their language more successfully than others to manipulate their 
social environment. The same is true for nonstandard speakers. The kinds 
of linguistic differences that I am considering in this article are those that 
separate individuals from one another, not those that separate social groups. 
A more serious objection to my thesis is that the demonstration of high 
linguistic ability is less a prerequisite of leadership than its consequence. 
Once in office a man may have an opportunity both to acquire linguistic 
skills and to exhibit linguistic talent that had previously lain dormant. Per- 
haps those who rise to leadership must talk on occasions that make them 
appear to have special skills. The apparent talent of leaders would then be 
an illusion. To sort out fully what is cause and what is effect in the relation 
of leadership and language requires more careful ethnographic studies than 
are now available, but the question is, at least, an empirical one. Unlike so 
many of the speculations about linguistic evolution, data should be obtain- 
able that would bear upon the question. In the meantime, the examples we 
already have do appear to suggest that it helps to have linguistic talent to 
start with. Observers who have addressed the question write as if the leaders 
they have known brought their skills to office with them. 
If leadership requires skillful language and if leaders have more progeny 
than others, we have identified a reasonably direct selective mechanism that 
would foster language of an increasingly complex sort. I do not, of course, 
mean to argue that this is the exclusive selective mechanism for linguistic 
evolution. Many other factors could have operated simultaneously. Nor do 
I mean to argue that all leaders in all societies are linguistically talented, or 
that no other attributes are important in the rise to leadership. There have 
surely been times and places where prowess in hunting or in fighting has 
been a more important quality for a leader than language, and we can cer- 
tainly find tongue-tied leaders. Still, the importance of other factors does 
not eliminate language, for selection can respond simultaneously to many 
different pressures. 
Nor does my argument deny that people of great linguistic talent can 
be found outside of the ranks of leaders. All that is needed for the mechanism 
I suggest to be effective is that the average leader in the average society 
have slightly more verbal facility and slightly more children than other men. 
Evolution, even human evolution, has been going on for a long time. Over 
the course of enough generations, even small and inconsistent differences 
in reproductive success can accumulate until they yield large effects. 
It would, of course, be more satisfactory if we could establish a direct 
connection between linguistic ability and numbers of children. The inter- 
vening variable of leadership complicates the equation. It is not entirely 
satisfying to note that Greek leaders were good talkers and that Yanomamo 
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leaders have more children. We would also like to know about the repro- 
ductive success of Greek leaders and the linguistic talents of Yanomamo 
leaders. It would also be more satisfactory if we could establish this rela- 
tionship in the types of hunting and gathering societies where the ability to 
speak evolved, but there are few such societies surviving and ethnographic 
evidence is lacking. On such points, all I can do is plead for more complete 
data. 
Unless one wants to deny that language evolved, however, I do not see 
how we can escape the presumption that high linguistic skill conferred some 
sort of selective advantage among our ancestors. Most of the advantages of 
language seem to be social, and it is in the social sphere that the advantages 
of some individuals over others seems to lie. Almost everyone would appear 
to have sufficient linguistic ability to carry out the technological tasks of a 
preurban society, but whenever there is competition, whether for leadership, 
for women, or for wealth, there is no limit to the linguistic refinements that 
could give one individual an advantage over another. Once it became ad- 
vantageous among evolving humans to command a language that is superior 
to that of one’s fellows, there could have been a steady and long-term pres- 
sure for ever more powerful linguistic ability. 
The evolutionary mechanism that I have proposed offers no solution to 
the puzzle of how language arose in the first place, but it does suggest an 
engine that, once started, could have driven the evolution of the capacity 
for language over a very long period of time, quite plausibly for several 
million years. During this period, language could have steadily improved 
without the improvements ever playing any central role in subsistence. Even- 
tually, however, an increasingly complex language must have implied an 
increasing power of conceptualization, and this may have preadapted the 
users of complex language to a radically different kind of life than that in 
which language first evolved. 
The cognitive abilities entailed by an improving language helped to bring 
about a species that was capable, first, of producing the refined art and tool 
assemblages that we find in the upper Paleolithic, and capable, later, of 
inventing the revolutionary civilization that began with agriculture and de- 
veloped into urban life. The urban revolution would hardly have been pos- 
sible had the biological and cognitive capacities for language not evolved 
first. With cities came trade, marketing, writing, record keeping, codified 
legal systems, hierarchical status, an increasing division of labor, bureau- 
cracy, specialists in religious ritual, the accumulation of recorded knowl- 
edge, systematic learning, formal education, and science. All these new 
activities depend crucially upon a kind of language that had evolved in an 
earlier era. Language, selected as a means for conducting increasingly re- 
lined social relationships, came finally to permit the vastly more complex 
organization of modern human society. Evolved as a delicate instrument for 
establishing and modulating ever more intricate relationships among human 
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beings, language continues to serve as such an instrument in the societies 
in which we live today. 
I am heavily indebted to numerous friends and colleagues who read earlier drafts of this paper 
and who did their best to dissuade me from my wilder and more confused ideas: A. L. Becker, 
Penelope Eckert, VirginiaGuilford, Mark V. Flinn, Anne Hvenekilde, Frank Livingstone, Bruce 
Mannheim, Thomas Moylan, Emanuel Polioudakis, Roy A. Rappaport, Virginia Vitzthum, and 
Aram A. Yengoyan. Three reviewers from this journal, one of whom, Robert Seyfarth, revealed 
his identity to me, offered exceedingly valuable comments and suggestions. I am particularly 
grateful to Richard Wrangham, who took me seriously when I first began to think about the 
ideas I offer here, and to Milford Wolpoff who kept arguing with me right up to the very last. 
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